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RECOGNITION AND THE CHARACTER OF SENECA’S MEDEA 
Erica Bexley, Swansea University 
 	
Abstract: This article examines the character and identity of Seneca’s Medea. 
Focusing on the recognition scene at the end of the play, I investigate how Medea 
constructs herself as both a literary figure and as an implied human personality. The 
concluding scene of Seneca’s Medea raises crucial questions about self-coherence and 
recognizability: in contrast to other moments of ἀναγνώρισις in Greco-Roman drama, 
it confirms the pre-existing facets of Medea’s identity, rather than revealing new ones. 
This concept of recognition as self-confirmation is also integral to Seneca’s Stoic 
view of human selfhood, and Medea’s use of Stoic principles in this play reinforces 
her dual status as textual entity and quasi-person.	
 
Character and identity are acute issues in Senecan drama. As scholars have often 
remarked, Seneca’s dramatis personae behave in a profoundly self-conscious manner, 
invoking their own names, evaluating their own roles, and seeming to know in 
advance the stories and deeds they are about to perform.1 This self-reflexive conduct 
is typically interpreted as an instance of meta-poetry, or more specifically, meta-
theatre, a device by which Seneca’s characters draw attention to previous versions of 
their theatrical roles.2 This popular and enduring theory centres, above all, on 
Seneca’s Medea, of whom Wilamowitz-Moellendorf quipped, nearly a century ago, 
that she had read Euripides.3 Thus, Seneca’s characters are said to be self-aware 
primarily because they are latecomers in a long tradition of dramatic literature. 
  This paper takes a different approach. It evaluates the self-conscious behaviour 
of Seneca’s Medea with reference not only to meta-theatre and literary precedent, but 
																																																								
Versions of this paper were presented at the University of Edinburgh’s Classics Seminar Series, and at 
the Cambridge Philological Society; lively discussion ensued on both occasions, and I am grateful for 
the responses I received. I would also like to thank the journal’s anonymous reviewers whose 
suggestions have lead to me clarify and improve the structure of this complex argument. Lastly, thanks 
are due to Ioannis Ziogas, as always, for his perceptive comments and unstinting encouragement. 
1 Fitch and McElduff (2002) provide a comprehensive overview. 
2 Meta-poetic and meta-theatrical interpretations of Senecan tragedy include: Boyle (1997), 112-37; 
Schiesaro (2003) 70-85; Littlewood (2004) 172-258; Erasmo (2004) 122-39; Kirichenko (2013) 17-
165; Trinacty (2014). 
3 Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1919 III) 62: “diese Medea hat Euripides gelesen”. 
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also to Stoic ideals of personal constancy.4 Focusing on the recognition scene that 
occurs at the end of this play, I examine how Seneca’s Medea constructs herself both 
as a literary entity and as an implied human personality. I propose that her self-
awareness, besides alluding to past versions of her role, indicates a standard of human 
behaviour described by Stoic ethics. Further, these two aspects of Medea’s identity – 
the meta-theatrical and the quasi-Stoic – do not compete but rather coalesce, since 
both treat the business of self-construction in fundamentally similar ways. For 
Seneca’s Medea, literary character and human identity tend to overlap. 	
RECOGNITION 
 
As a means of evaluating Medea’s character, this paper also explores the close 
relationship that Seneca envisages between performance, identity, and recognition. I 
have chosen to concentrate on recognition scenes because these moments provide 
crucial insight into how Seneca’s characters construct their own and others’ sense of 
self. Recognition in dramatic texts is an event that draws attention to issues of 
characterization, motivation, psychology, and typology; it is a moment when 
questions of identity are brought to the fore.  
 Moreover, this connection between ἀναγνώρισις and character is part of 
recognition’s status as “a peculiarly dramatic device”.5 Recognition belongs to drama 
more than to any other literary genre, the reason being that it implicates a character’s 
identity in precisely the same way that theatrical performance implicates an actor’s. 
When performers assume a role, they not only destabilize their own identity – at least 
in the eyes of others – but they also raise the far more troubling possibility that all 
human selfhood is precariously fluid. This possibility arises from the actor’s skill in 																																																								
4 The possibility of combining meta-theatre and Stoicism, with reference to Medea’s recognition scene, 
is raised by Bartsch (2006) 255-62.	
5 Goldman (2000) 8. 
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editing, rehearsing, and developing behaviour so that it appears seamless and 
convincing.6 Such self-fashioning belies to some extent the idea of naturally unified 
identity, and when skilled theatrical performers portray an image of unified selfhood, 
they paradoxically reveal that selfhood to be a construct and its image to be an 
illusion. The issue, therefore, is not merely that actors engage in contrived conduct, 
but that their professional activity blends the categories of ‘natural’ and ‘contrived’, 
and prevents any simple distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘fiction’, ‘person’ and 
‘character’. 
 It follows that the anxiety attendant upon ἀναγνώρισις in ancient drama reflects 
the ontological anxiety surrounding actors themselves. Recognition in dramatic 
performance typically attempts to dispel the threat of problematic selfhood by 
generating a sense of resolution and declaring the newly revealed or more fully 
apprehended identity to be true and correct. Ion is restored to himself when Creusa 
recognises his birth tokens; Oedipus is likewise restored to himself, albeit unhappily, 
when he uncovers the truth about Laius’ killer; Sophocles’ Orestes reveals himself to 
Electra at the conclusion of an elaborate performance in which he has earlier gone so 
far as to announce his own death.7 In every case, the formerly deceptive or mistaken 
identity is pronounced a momentary aberration rejected in favour of a more 
fundamental, and presumably natural, kind of selfhood. Against the actor’s protean 
qualities, recognition scenes champion the claims of birth, family ties, and inherent 
characteristics. Even when they occur in the middle of a play’s action, such scenes 
																																																								
6	The notion of seamless performance or ‘flow’, on stage and in life, is explored by Goldman (2000) 
63-73 and Turner (1982) 55-6.	
7 This final example, the recognition scene in Sophocles’ Electra, achieves resolution not just by 
stabilizing identity and re-establishing a family relationship, but also by likening Orestes to a tragic 
messenger (El. 1098-1114), thus evoking the penultimate scene of a tragedy, and by association, the 
concluding function of ἀναγνώρισις. On Orestes as a messenger, see Ringer (1998) 185-6. 
	 4	
constitute moments of resolution and stability,8 so much so that they feature 
increasingly as a denouement in ancient drama; it is no coincidence that all of 
Seneca’s recognition scenes take place at the ends of his plays. 
 Thus, the traditional recognition scene in Greek and Roman drama is a moment 
that pivots upon revelation, as characters either uncover a previously misapprehended 
identity, or realize more fully the capacities of an individual they have hitherto 
underestimated. As Aristotle defines it, the central principle of recognition scenes is 
change (µεταβολή, Poetics 1542a), whether that change applies to largely external 
circumstances, like social status and family relationship, or internal ones, such as a 
character’s ethos and sense of self. The act of ἀναγνώρισις is, typically, a turning 
point that resolves uncertainties, reveals secrets, and clarifies misunderstandings.9 
Seneca, however, handles the recognition scene of his Medea in a unique way, 
treating it as a moment in which identity, far from being altered or rediscovered, is 
instead amplified and thereby validated. Genuine and constructed selfhood are not 
incompatible in Seneca’s view, with the result that his characters engage in 
performance as a means of self-realization. They approach recognition as the final 
stage in a steady and inherently theatrical process of moral and psychological 
development, which they pursue over the course of an entire play. In the words of 
Brian Hook: “Senecan self-presentation does not operate as self-revelation as much as 
self-confirmation.”10 
 Consequent to its focus on identity, ἀναγνώρισις may be said to delineate 
character in two main ways: as an implied human personality and as a textual 
																																																								
8 Thus Cave (2008) 122: “The typical recognition plot deals in closure”.	9	Such clarification may, however, be only temporary. Duckworth (1952) 151-60 discusses examples 
from palliata in which recognition complicates later action. On recognition and disclosure, see 
Kennedy and Lawrence (2008) 2.	
10 Hook (2000) 58. 
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construct.11 The duality is confirmed by the act of recognition itself, which draws 
attention on the one hand to a character’s selfhood, and to the confluence of actor and 
character (as we have seen), and on the other hand, emphasizes a character’s status as 
a fabricated dramatic entity. While the mimetic or representational aspect of 
recognition deals with a character’s ethos – and behind it, a performer’s ethos – the 
semiotics of recognition treat that ethos as an assemblage of textual information. In 
semiotic terms, the act of recognizing means interpreting correctly the signs that 
indicate a given character’s identity: the marks on Oedipus’ body; the tokens kept in 
Ion’s box. Terence Cave notes that scenes of recognition become “a focus for 
reflection on the way fictions as such are constituted.”12 They can resemble processes 
of reading and writing, as characters and audience alike are called upon to analyze the 
symbols displayed before them and to organize those symbols into some kind of 
coherent whole. Such ‘textual recognition’ (as I shall call it) often occurs at the 
expense of ‘ethical recognition’ and vice versa, since highlighting one requires us to 
dismiss or minimize the other. We may read a character either as a quasi-human or as 
a literary entity; the two rarely coincide. But Seneca’s recognition scenes are one 
example of this rare coincidence: the figures involved in them construct their 





The final exchange between Jason and Medea begins with Medea standing on the roof 
of her house, accompanied by one child and carrying the body of the other in her 																																																								11	My categories derive from Phelan (1989) 2-14, who defines these two major elements of literary 
character as ‘mimetic’ (implied human personality) and ‘synthetic’ (textual construct). Woloch (2003) 
15-17 presents a similarly balanced view of literary character, declaring it a divided entity “always 
emerging at the juncture of structure and reference.”	
12 Cave (1988) 46. Likewise, Kennedy and Lawrence (2008) 2: “recognition becomes key to the way 
we make meaning and the way we read.”	
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arms. In defiance of Jason’s pleas, she kills the second son, climbs into an airborne 
chariot and throws the children’s bodies down to their father, declaring: “do you 
recognize your wife? / This is how I usually escape” (coniugem agnoscis tuam? / sic 
fugere soleo, Med. 1021-2).13 At first glance, the request seems meta-theatrical, and 
this is how it has most often been interpreted.14 By asking Jason whether he 
recognizes her, Seneca’s Medea highlights her status as a dramatic character that has 
performed the same story in Euripides’ and Ennius’ dramas, probably in Ovid’s lost 
tragedy as well.15 Seneca’s use of agnoscere supports this meta-theatrical 
interpretation, not only because of its self-reflexive presence in a recognition scene, 
but also because, as Stephen Hinds has shown, Latin poets often used the verb to 
signify their allusions to earlier writers.16 agnoscere denotes an open practice of 
poetic appropriation, as in Seneca the Elder’s remark that Ovid lifted phrases from 
Vergil non subripiendi causa, sed palam mutuandi, hoc animo ut vellet agnosci (“not 
for the sake of stealing, but of borrowing openly, with the intent that it be recognized” 
Suas. 3.7).17 If we grant that Seneca too employs the verb in this way, then Medea’s 
question to Jason doubles as the playwright’s question to his audience members, 
prompting them to recall other literary versions of Medea and to judge how the 
current one compares. With the phrase sic fugere soleo, Seneca’s Medea may also be 
referring to her departure from the scene in an airborne chariot, an act that likewise 																																																								
13 All English translations in this article are my own, and all references to Senecan tragedy are based 
on Zwierlein’s 1986 edition, unless otherwise noted. 
14 See, for instance, Boyle (1997) 132 and (2014) cxv-cxvii and ad Med. 1019-22; Littlewood (2004) 
192; Trinacty (2014) 125-6; Winterbottom (1976) 39.  
15 On the traceable parallels between Euripides’ and Seneca’s Medeas, see Costa (1973) 8; Gill (1987); 
and Lefèvre (1997). Arcellashi (1990) examines Medea’s role in Roman drama, and Manuwald (2013) 
presents a deft survey of the heroine’s changing representation in Latin literature. Too little of Ovid’s 
Medea survives for scholars to gauge its influence on Seneca’s version. There are, however, 
demonstrable links between Ovid’s depiction of Medea in Heroides 12 and Metamorphoses 7, and the 
figure portrayed in Seneca’s tragedy: see Leo (1878) 166-70, and for more recent discussion, Boyle 
(2014) lxxiii-lxxvi; Hinds (1993) 34-43; and Trinacty (2007) and (2014) 93-126. 
16 Hinds (1998) 9.	
17 A possible connection suggested by Bartsch (2006) 262. 
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occurs at the end of Euripides.18 Like agnoscis, soleo can function as an ‘Alexandrian 
footnote’, signalling the literary tradition that informs Medea’s current behaviour.19 
The overall effect of Medea’s question, on this reading, is to widen as much as 
possible the gap between intra- and extra-dramatic levels of recognition: the audience 
comprehends who Medea is because the audience has read Euripides, Ennius, and 
Ovid, while Jason, presumably, has not. 
 It is also tempting to infer from Medea’s combination of soleo and agnoscis a 
reference to the visual dimension of theatre, whereby any given scene may reproduce 
aspects of other, preceding performances. This argument must remain speculative, 
given the lack of evidence for Seneca’s plays ever being staged during his lifetime. 
Yet, even if Seneca’s Medea was not performed in front of a first-century AD Roman 
audience, the visual qualities of its final scene – Medea above in a chariot; Jason 
below on the ground – could still be understood as replicating the visual qualities of 
Euripides’ version. And, in the unknowable event that Seneca’s tragedy was actually 
performed during his lifetime, Medea’s agnoscis would surely encourage the audience 
to recognize this visual parallel.20 Such ‘optical allusion’ – as Robert Cowan has 
dubbed the technique – is not uncommon in ancient drama, a famous example being 
Aristophanes’ use of the mechane in the Peace (80-179) to parody Euripides’ 
Bellerophon (fr. 306-308 Kannicht).21 It would, of course, be even more meta-
																																																								
18 Medea’s airborne departure also occurs habitually in Ovid Met. 7 (220-3; 350-1; 398), another of 
Seneca’s major sources. 
19 The term ‘Alexandrian footnote’ derives from Ross (1975) 78, where it describes Roman writers’ 
methods of appealing to literary tradition. On Seneca’s soleo as an Alexandrian footnote, see Boyle 
(1997) 132 and Cowan (2011) 363.	
20 As Boyle (2014) cxvi points out, there is also the opportunity for Jason (and the audience) to 
recognize, visually, the correspondence between Medea’s character and her mask. 
21 Cowan (2013). 
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theatrical to evoke such visual recollection in the context of an actual recognition 
scene.22 
 
PERFORMANCE AND RECOGNITION IN SENECA’S STOICISM 
 
Seneca’s Medea emerges from the preceding interpretation as a self-consciously 
theatrical construct, a literary entity assembled from earlier texts and a dramatic role 
embodied by earlier performers. Yet her status as a dramatis persona does not 
preclude her occupying equal status as an implied human personality. In fact, her 
‘textual’ and ‘ethical’ identity overlap in this scene, because by drawing attention to 
previous dramatic versions of herself, Medea invites the audience to see in her current 
behaviour the degree of self-coherence necessary for creating a stable, recognizable 
ethos.23 Medea is who she is because she behaves in keeping with the requirements of 
her role and thereby enables others to perceive a link between her deeds and her 
nature.24 Seneca discusses precisely this idea at the end of Epistle 120; he does so, 
moreover, in terms that cannot fail to evoke the dramatic tradition of recognition 
scenes: 
Magnam rem puta unum hominem agere. Praeter sapientem autem nemo unum agit, 
ceteri multiformes sumus. Modo frugi tibi videbimur et graves, modo prodigi et vani; 
mutamus subinde personam et contrariam ei sumimus quam exuimus. Hoc ergo a te 
exige, ut qualem institueris praestare te, talem usque ad exitum serves; effice ut possis 




22 Thus, Easterling (1997) 168-9 argues for visual similarity between the Aeschylean, Sophoclean, and 
Euripidean versions of Electra’s reunion with Orestes: in Aeschylus, Electra carries an urn of funeral 
offerings (Ch. 84-151); in Sophocles, Orestes presents Electra with an empty urn (El. 1113-1219); in 
Euripides, Electra carries a water jar (El. 54-149). The latter two versions evoke aspects of the 
Aeschylean “stage picture” partly in order to summon recognition from the audience.  
23 Bartsch (2006) 261 makes a similar observation: “The result of the drama’s attention to the question 
of recognition is that personal self-recognition and literary recognition necessarily coalesce here.” See 
also Boyle (2014) cxvi. 
24 A point raised by Sissa (2006) 41-2, in relation to tragic ἀναγνώρισις: “Tell me how you act and I 
will tell you what kind of person you are...recognition of agency implies recognition of moral identity, 
because the nature of an act...exposes the character of the agent.” See also Aristotle Poetics 1452a35.	
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Consider it a great thing to play the part of one man. Besides the sage, however, no 
one plays the part of one man; the rest of us are multiform. Now we seem to you 
sober and serious, now wasteful and vain; we keep changing our mask and we put on 
the opposite of what we have taken off. Therefore, demand this of yourself: that you 
maintain right to the end the character you have resolved to present. Bring it about 




The central idea in this passage concerns self-coherence: Seneca advises Lucilius that 
he must behave in a consistent manner if he wishes to render himself recognizable to 
others.25 Coming at the end of Seneca’s extended theatrical analogy, the word 
adgnosci suggests the concluding function of many recognition scenes. Yet, contrary 
to most dramatic practice, Lucilius’ true identity is established not through revelation, 
but through steady confirmation. The recognition that Seneca envisages in Epistle 120 
involves no unveiling of a previously unsuspected identity; rather, Lucilius is 
understood and acknowledged as the person he has always, consistently been. 
Likewise, when Seneca declares at the beginning of Epistle 31, agnosco Lucilium 
meum (“I recognize my Lucilius”), he means that Lucilius is now fulfilling the 
promise he had previously displayed (incipit, quem promiserat, exhibere, Ep. 31.1). 
Lucilius has not suddenly altered his character, but has simply come closer to 
perfecting a disposition to which he aspires.26 The same may be said of Seneca’s 
Medea, who seeks recognition for an identity she has been developing, steadily and 
cold-bloodedly, over the entire course of her play. Medea has not changed her 
personality in the tragedy’s final few lines, nor has she revealed a new aspect of 
herself; she has merely amplified and perfected a role she has long desired to play. 
																																																								
25 Fuller discussion of this letter and its implications for Senecan tragedy can be found in Star (2012) 
65-9. See also the comments of Brunt (1975) 13 on constantia and dramatic analogies in Stoic ethics. 
26 An issue treated by Bartsch (2006) 260-2.	
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 Medea’s self-fashioning is most apparent in the way she cites her own name at 
critical points in the tragedy. Although her illeism has already attracted considerable 
scholarly attention,27 it is worth reviewing briefly here, in order to show how Medea 
uses it to ensure her self-coherence. Compared to Euripides’ heroine, who utters her 
own name on only one occasion (Eur. Med. 402), Seneca’s does so seven times: 
“Medea remains” (Medea superest, 166); “Medea is a greater fear” (est et his maior 
metus / Medea, 516-17); “Medea does not compel you” (nec…te… / Medea cogit, 
523-4); “undertake whatever Medea can do” (incipe / quidquid Medea potest, 566-7); 
“now I am Medea” (Medea nunc sum, 910). She even begins the play by invoking 
deities quosque Medeae magis / fas est precari (“whom it is more right / for Medea to 
call upon”, 8-9); later, she rationalizes that her children’s crime is having Medea for a 
mother (et maius scelus / Medea mater, 933-4); when the Nurse uses Medea’s name 
to command her attention, the heroine famously replies, “I shall become” (Nut: 
Medea— Med: Fiam, 171). The cumulative effect of all this self-naming is that 
Medea’s conduct becomes a process of self-construction in which the protagonist 
knows her role and strives to live up to it.28 Like Lucilius in Epistle 120, Seneca’s 
Medea tries as much as possible to remain ‘in character’. She performs herself both in 
the literal sense of acting a dramatic part and in the figurative sense of developing a 
stable, recognizable identity. Her behaviour throughout the play is simultaneously 
meta-theatrical and quasi-Stoic; her self-citation alludes to her previous appearances 
in drama, and in literature more generally, at the same time as it emphasizes 
continuity between her past, present, and future actions.  
																																																								
27 See in particular the important studies by Traina (1979) 273-5; Segal (1982) 241-2; and Petrone 
(1988) 61-2. Fitch and McElduff (2002) 24-7 make some pertinent, general comments on self-naming 
in Senecan tragedy. 
28 So Fitch and McElduff (2002) 25: “self-naming is often a way of defining who one should be, an 
index of the gap between one’s present performance and one’s ideal role.”	
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 Medea’s fiam at line 171 is a particularly telling example of this overlap 
between meta-theatrical and Stoic versions of her identity. On the one hand, the word 
conveys Medea’s awareness of her own literary past and presents her behaviour as a 
model derived from earlier poetry. In fact, it confirms Medea’s already paradigmatic 
status via allusion to Hypsipyle’s remark in Heroides 6.151, Medeae Medea forem (“I 
would have been a Medea to Medea”).29 On the other hand, fiam evokes not just 
textual identity, but a slow and deliberate process of ethical self-construction. Medea 
will ‘become’ Medea because she will ‘be made’ into Medea: the verb’s passive force 
connotes a quintessentially Senecan Stoic project of self-reform, one that splits the 
individual into moral agent and malleable object. Seneca uses the verb in a similar 
manner at De Ira 2.10.6, when he declares, neminem nasci sapientem sed fieri (“the 
wise man is not born but made”). Interpreted alongside such evidence, Medea’s 
promise to work upon and thereby achieve an ideal version of herself begins to sound 
like a distinctly Stoic goal. Her ethical identity is no less consciously constructed, and 
no less paradigmatic than her textual one. 
 Medea’s self-citation is also quasi-Stoic in the way it leads her to resemble an 
actor. Just as a theatrical performer adopts a part and endeavours subsequently to 
maintain it, so does Medea strive to bridge the gap between her current self and her 
ideal role. In this regard, too, her behaviour relates to Seneca’s advice in Epistle 120, 
where the main point of the theatrical analogy is to associate people with stage 
performers.30 According to Seneca, most individuals change their masks frequently 
(mutamus subinde personam), but the wise man plays just a single role, that of 
himself (unum hominem agere). Thus, far from claiming that all acting is inherently 																																																								
29 A connection explored by Trinacty (2007) 71-2. 
30 Frede (2007) 160 discusses the ways in which Stoic theatrical metaphors establish a link between 
actors and human beings; see also Gibson (2007) 125. Sources – mostly philosophical – that use the 
‘dramatic simile of life’ have been collected by Kokolakis (1969). 
	 12	
deceptive, Seneca allows the possibility that consistent performance will in fact 
establish and enhance genuine selfhood. His idea most likely rests on Stoic persona-
theory, in which people are understood to perform roles that merge with and thereby 
display normative aspects of their identity.31  The main proponents of this theory, 
Panaetius and Cicero,32 hold that human selfhood comprises four distinct facets or 
personae, each of which must be observed according to what befits it.33 Tailoring 
one’s conduct to one’s persona is the ethical equivalent of achieving a seamless 
performance: both activities require an outwardly directed display of self-coherence 
intended to guarantee recognizable identity; actor and character are assumed 
ultimately to coalesce. Further, the theatrical metaphor of Stoic persona-theory shares 
with actual dramatic performance an interest in the conscious construction of identity, 
emphasizing choice and deliberate self-fashioning over any notion of unalterably in-
born character. In all of these respects Stoic persona-theory maps neatly onto the 
behaviour of Seneca’s Medea: she understands in advance the crucial aspects of her 
character and develops her conduct accordingly; she aims at self-coherence; she 
presents herself simultaneously as dramatis persona and actor; and she fashions her 
identity at a pitch of self-consciousness unsurpassed by any other Senecan 
protagonist. The persona resulting from Medea’s actions may not be the slightest bit 
Stoic, but the means used to create it are. 
 																																																								
31 On the relationship between performance and identity in Stoic persona-theory, see Burchell (1998), 
and Bartsch (2006) 220-9. Gill (1988) explores how the theory engages with concepts of personhood 
and personality. Nédoncelle (1948) provides useful background by discussing the semantic range of the 
term persona. 
32 Although Panaetius’ work has been lost, it is widely regarded as the basis for Cicero’s account of 
persona-theory in the De Officiis (1.107-21). Cicero himself (Att. 16.11.4) acknowledges Panaetius as 
his source. For more detail on Cicero’s Panaetian background, see the introductory summary in Dyck 
1996, 17-29, and fuller treatments in Pohlenz 1934, and Gärtner 1974. De Lacy (1977) 169 demurs – 
against Cicero’s own statement – that nothing specifically identifies Panaetius as the author of Cicero’s 
fourfold persona-theory, but admits that there are very few alternatives. 
33 The role of ‘fitting behaviour’ (τὸ πρέπον, decorum) in Stoic persona-theory is discussed by Brunt 




One does not have to look far in Seneca’s tragedy to find evidence of Medea’s 
consummate ability to ‘play one person’ (unum hominem agere). So unvarying are the 
traits she exhibits throughout the play that many of her final deeds are alluded to as 
early as her opening monologue. To some extent, this is a standard Senecan 
technique, whereby the tragedies’ initial scenes hint obliquely and ironically at events 
the audience knows will occur by the plays’ end.34 Yet the parallels between Medea’s 
first speech and final actions are so close that they suggest a greater than usual effort 
on Seneca’s part to link the two scenes. For instance, Medea proclaims darkly that she 
has “given birth to her revenge” (parta iam, parta ultio est: / peperi, 25-6), and 
resumes the metaphor when she remarks, “a home created through crime must be 
abandoned through crime” (quae scelere parta est, scelere linquenda est domus, 55). 
Further hints of infanticide lurk in Medea’s exhortation to “seek a path to revenge 
through the vitals themselves” (per viscera ipsa quaere supplicio viam, 40), referring 
in this instance to the entrails of a sacrificial animal, but also anticipating the murder 
of her offspring, and perhaps even evoking her later claim to search out with a sword 
any child still hiding in her viscera (in matre si quo pignus etiamnunc latet / scrutabor 
ense viscera et ferro extraham, 1112-13).35 The Medea of the opening monologue 
even asserts that greater crimes befit her after becoming a mother (maiora iam me 
scelera post partus decent, 50), a remark that foreshadows both her infanticide and 
the source of her perfected identity. Thus, the character Medea envisages for herself at 
the tragedy’s outset is the same one that she exhibits at its end. If recognition of her 
capacities comes as no surprise that is not just because the audience already knows 																																																								
34 Pratt (1983) 34. 
35 Medea’s reference to sacrifice in lines 38-40 is, in the words of Costa (1973) ad loc., “enigmatic and 
sinister”: besides indicating actual, sacrificial animals, the victimae Medea mentions may be variously 
interpreted as Jason and Creusa or Medea’s children, while, as Zwierlein (1986b) proposes, the viscera 
could be regarded as belonging to Medea herself.	
	 14	
her story, but also because she has pursued the kind of coherent self-presentation 
designed to ensure other people’s acknowledgement of her identity. Medea, like the 
Stoic sage, does not change her mask. 
 Just as Medea’s eventual infanticide is apparent from her opening monologue, 
so too is her flight from the stage in an airborne chariot, since as part of her initial 
complaint, Medea appeals to her ancestor, the Sun, to “entrust her with the reins, and 
allow her to guide the fiery steeds with blazing straps” (committe habenas, genitor, et 
flagrantibus / ignifera loris tribue moderari iuga, 33-4). It is a standard feature of 
recognition scenes that they connect the past with the present, usually by recalling 
events that happened offstage in a time prior to the drama’s beginning: Aeschylus’ 
Electra recognizes the cloth she wove for baby Orestes; Oedipus discovers himself by 
tracing his origins back to the moment his parents exposed him.36 In Seneca’s Medea, 
however, the past recalled most strongly in the recognition scene is the protagonist’s 
initial monologue; this opening speech glances forward to the drama’s end where it is 
fully reified. The result, again, is that Medea’s assertion of selfhood involves no act of 
revelation: past and present have been joined seamlessly, with no intervening period 
in which Medea’s character has deviated – or been seen to deviate – from its true 
form. 
 Medea’s relentless pursuit of a behavioural ideal also emerges from her use of 
the word decent in line 50 (maiora iam me scelera post partus decent). Deliberately 
or not, this verb evokes the Stoic concept of decorum, which describes the beauty and 
harmony resulting from appropriate, self-coherent conduct.37 Significantly, decorum 
is closely related to notions of self-performance, as the following passage from 
Cicero’s De Officiis demonstrates: 																																																								
36 On recognition scenes linking the past to the present, see Zeitlin (2012). 
37 On Stoic decorum, see above n. 33. 
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expendere oportebit quid quisque habeat sui eaque moderari, nec velle experiri quam 
se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet quod est cuiusque maxime. Suum 
quisque igitur noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem 
praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non 
optimas sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt 
 
Each person ought to consider what characteristics belong to him, and to manage 
them, without wishing to test how someone else’s characteristics might suit him; for 
what suits each person most of all is that which is most his own. Let each man 
therefore know his own natural disposition and show himself a sharp judge of his 
good morals and vices, so that actors may not seem to have more wisdom than us. For 
they select not the best plays, but the ones most appropriate for them 
 
(De Off. 1.113-14) 
Cicero’s advice has much in common with the end of Seneca’s 120th Epistle: both 
texts compare people to actors; both stress the need for individuals to remain 
consistent within their chosen roles. Where Seneca warns against changing masks, 
Cicero cautions people not to exchange their characteristics for others’ that may not 
suit them (nec velle experiri quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet 
quod est cuiusque maxime). On this analysis, achieving decorum is the equivalent of 
‘playing one person’. Although Medea’s actions are far from being examples of Stoic 
morality, it could hardly be said of her that she does not know her own nature and 
does not cleave to what befits her. In a phrase that resembles Cicero’s injunction for 
each man to know his own natural disposition (suum quisque noscat ingenium), 
Seneca’s Medea declares, “now I am Medea; my disposition has grown through evils” 
(Medea nunc sum; crevit ingenium malis, 910).38 Too limited to signal a direct 
allusion, the parallel points instead to the fact that these two texts articulate similar 
sets of ideas. By citing the same concept as Cicero, Medea illustrates the extent of her 
self-knowledge and consciously monitored conduct: her decorum may be deeply 
disturbing, but it is decorum all the same. 																																																								
38 Gibson (2007) 121-2 and Dyck (1996) ad Off. 114 both see in Cicero’s suum quisque...noscat 
ingenium a submerged reference to Delphi’s γνῶθι σεαυτόν. Seneca’s Medea, likewise, seems to know 
herself very well, and this possible link to Delphi’s motto is reinforced by Medea’s ancestry: she is the 
daughter of the Sun, and Apollo is the sun god.	
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 Furthermore, Medea’s decorum is textual as well as ethical, because the term 
denotes not just appropriate behaviour, but also literary appropriateness.39 Horace in 
the Ars Poetica, for instance, uses decet to describe the fit between style and genre 
(singula quaeque locum teneant sortita decentem; “let each individual thing, allotted, 
keep to its appropriate place” AP 92), or the way a character’s words harmonize with 
his or her emotions (tristia maestum / voltum verba decent, iratum plena minarum; 
“sad words suit a sorrowful face, threating words an angry one” AP 105-6). Viewed 
against this background, Medea’s aspiration to commit suitable crimes becomes a 
meta-literary and, more narrowly, meta-theatrical statement that draws attention to her 
conduct as a fabricated dramatic character. The link between textual and ethical 
identity is closer still, because meta-theatricality helps the audience comprehend 
Medea’s self-consistency: only if we know Medea’s story in advance can we truly 
appreciate the uniformity of her conduct.40 The semantic range of decet is yet another 
indication of how Medea’s quasi-Stoic identity blends into her literary one and vice 
versa. 
 
MEDEA AND THE SAPIENS 
 
It may seem odd, at first, to attribute quasi-Stoic behaviour to Seneca’s Medea, a 
woman in the grip of passion and plotting a terrible revenge. It can and has been 
argued that Medea’s identity actually disintegrates over the course of the play.41 If 
one takes the Stoic position, broadly stated, that nature equals virtue, then Seneca’s 
Medea can hardly be said to live in accordance with her own nature, let alone Nature 
with a capital ‘N’. If, as Seneca asserts, nobody except the sapiens can succeed in 																																																								
39 The overlap between aesthetic/literary and ethical appropriateness is discussed by Gibson (2007) 
115-47. 
40 Similarly, Gill (1987) 32 remarks of Medea’s final monologue: “Medea’s self-reinforcement by her 
image of herself gains force by allusion to the literary tradition in which that image has come to be 
shaped.” 
41 Henry and Walker (1967) 175-9 and (1985) 113-14; Gill (2006) 421-35.	
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‘playing the role of one man’, does Medea’s submission to ira and furor mean that 
she fluctuates and must, by definition, be inconsistent? 
 There is no easy answer to this question. Recent work by Shadi Bartsch and 
Christopher Star has demonstrated how deeply Stoic notions of selfhood permeate 
Seneca’s tragedies, to the extent that Seneca’s dramatis personae employ Stoic 
methods of self-construction to vastly un-Stoic ends.42 In a related vein, Roy Gibson 
has shown how Ovid spots and playfully slips through loopholes in Cicero’s theory of 
appropriate behaviour.43 The conduct of Seneca’s Medea could likewise be regarded 
as illustrating potential contradictions at the heart of Cicero’s and Seneca’s ethical 
theory, since emphasis on self-consistency leaves open the slim possibility of people 
persevering in wickedness, and emphasis laid upon fitting behaviour – quid decet – 
can surely lead to individuals perpetrating further crimes on the basis that such action 
suits their moral makeup.44 In addition, the theatrical metaphor of Stoic persona-
theory leaves little if any room between the role and the person: if you are your 
persona, what happens when the most appropriate persona for you is Medea, or 
Atreus?45 An approach to selfhood that relies so much on dramatic analogies 
inevitably runs into problems when placed in actual drama. Seneca’s Medea does 
exhibit the irrational, passionate behaviour that brands her the antithesis of the 
																																																								
42 Bartsch (2006) 255-81; Star (2006) and (2012) 62-83. Johnson (1988) 93-7 also sees in Seneca’s 
Medea a perverted image of the Stoic proficiens. 
43 Gibson (2007) 117-29. 
44 Although, as Gill (2006) 431-2 notes, a decision may be made in favour of the passions according to 
what is mistakenly perceived as appropriate, and this will not result in true, Stoic decorum. Cicero, too, 
circumvents the possibility of ‘bad’ decorum by declaring admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, 
non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur (De Off. 1.110) 
The difficulty in Senecan drama, however, is that a character’s decorum is primarily literary – e.g. 
Medea cannot not commit infanticide – and therefore tends to warp the parameters of ethical self-
development. Since Medea’s dramatic persona is such that she must engage in criminal acts, pursuing 
ethical decorum requires her to decide in favour of destructive, irrational behavior. 
45 As Gibson (2007) 122-6 demonstrates, this issue troubles Cicero’s treatment of decorum and 
persona-theory throughout De Officiis 1.92-151.	
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sapiens, yet she also displays a remarkable ability to monitor and fashion her conduct 
along Stoic lines. 
 Such an impasse need not imply that Seneca intended to criticize in his 
tragedies principles he had preached elsewhere;46 the cause is subtler than that, and 
may well lie not (or not only) in the potential conflicts of philosophy, but in Seneca’s 
vocabulary. Because Seneca conceives of identity and morality in Stoic terms, he uses 
his arsenal of distinctly Stoic language to describe people and their morals, regardless 
of whether those people are real or fictive. In the case of his Medea, acts of self-
exhortation, her desire to achieve a goal and consequently, to arrive at a version of 
herself, must all be conveyed in broadly Stoic vocabulary because this, for Seneca, is 
the definitive way of portraying identity, judgement, and action. The uniformity of 
Seneca’s style across his philosophical and dramatic oeuvre leads to friction between 
artistry and ethics, but that friction may not be entirely intentional on Seneca’s part. 
 A clear example of this stylistic overlap is Seneca’s Cato who, in the De 
Providentia, behaves in almost exactly the same manner as Seneca’s Medea.47 The 
Cato portrayed in this text cites his own name as a means of ensuring that his 
impending suicide fits the reputation he has so far assumed: “Cato has a way out” 
(Cato qua exeat habet, De Prov. 2.10); “this sword will grant Cato the freedom it was 
not able to grant the fatherland” (ferrum istud...libertatem, quam patriae non potuit, 
Catoni dabit, De Prov. 2.10); “for Cato, seeking death at another’s hands is as 
disgraceful as seeking life” (tam turpe est Catoni mortem ab ullo petere quam vitam, 
De Prov. 2.10).  Like Medea, Cato envisages his self as a role from which he should 																																																								
46 As implied by Dingel (1974) 118, who argues that Seneca’s tragedies contradict his philosophy at 
the most fundamental level. The majority of scholars dealing with this issue pursue a more moderate 
approach, asserting that Seneca’s plays engage with his philosophy chiefly by providing negative 
exempla of the passions; a representative sample of such scholarship includes: Knoche (1941); Lefèvre 
(1969); Pratt (1983) 73-131; Henry and Walker (1985); Davis (2003) 69-74.  
47 Broad correspondence between these two figures is noted by Johnson (1988) 88.	
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not deviate; he treats his past identity as a paradigm for future conduct. He even refers 
explicitly to the concept of decorum when he defines death by another’s hand as “a 
compact with fate that does not suit [his] greatness” (fati conventio...quae non deceat 
magnitudinem nostram, De Prov. 2.10).48 The evident parallels between Cato and 
Medea generate difficulties for Seneca’s ethical theory: while Cato puts his precepts 
to a relatively innocuous purpose and ends up being applauded for his constantia, 
Medea adopts the same attitudes as a means of accomplishing her revenge. The 
outcome depends upon which character one chooses to maintain. 
 Another crucial point to emerge from Medea and Cato’s resemblance is that 
invoking one’s own name does not have to be meta-theatrical. Although Cato’s death 
is certainly dramatic, and although Seneca frames the episode as a “spectacle worthy 
for a god to gaze upon” (spectaculum dignum ad quod respiciat…deus, De Prov. 
2.9),49 Cato is performing himself as an ethical rather than intrinsically theatrical role, 
as a person rather than as a character. It stands to reason that Seneca’s Medea can be 
doing precisely the same thing. 
 
RECOGNITION WITHOUT REVELATION 
 
Seneca’s heroine fashions herself so consciously and consistently that the audience 
ends up recognizing a figure it has known all along. Jason, we may assume, also 
recognizes his wife’s ethical identity, since it is difficult to imagine his responding to 
her question with anything other than ‘yes’.50 Of course, Jason’s knowledge is not 
																																																								
48 In a similar manner, Cicero in De Officiis 1.112 argues that suicide was an act suited to Cato’s 
persona: atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse 
consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia 
ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt?...Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem, 
eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio 
permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 
49 On Cato’s death as spectacle and Cato as actor, see Edwards (2002) 390-1; Solimano (1991) 70-1; 
Hijmans (1966) 237-8. 
50 As Bartsch (2006) 261 wryly observes.	
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quite the same as the audience’s, because his recognition of Medea involves painful 
realization of his own errors, a mild form of Aristotle’s peripeteia. What Jason 
experiences in the tragedy’s final scene is a moment of re-appraising and re-knowing 
(hence: ἀνα-γνωρίζω) a person he knew before, but whom he had seriously 
underestimated.51 Forcing Jason to this new level of comprehension is certainly one of 
Medea’s aims, but it is a less important one than having Jason contribute to her own 
self-construction. Above all, Medea wants Jason to validate her achievement: when he 
arrives to witness her final act of murder, Medea calls him a “spectator” (spectator 
iste, 993) and declares that she has wasted any crimes committed outside his presence 
(quidquid sine isto fecimus sceleris perit, 994).52 Besides being meta-theatrical and 
deeply sadistic,53 this desire for an audience is a symptom of Medea’s careful self-
fashioning, since, as Seneca and Cicero both imply, consistent conduct must be seen 
in order to be recognized. If people are equated with actors, it follows that their deeds 
are supposed to be on display. Thus, Medea expects acknowledgement from Jason; 
her final exchange with him hinges on the authorizing rather than revelatory function 
of recognition. ἀναγνώρισις in this instance does not involve unmasking or disclosure, 
but continuity and thus, corroboration. 
 Likewise, when Medea declares, “this is how I usually escape” – sic fugere 
soleo – she pushes Jason to acknowledge continuity between her past and present 
conduct. We have seen already how the statement may refer specifically to Medea’s 
leaving the stage in a serpent-drawn chariot, but it can just as easily signify her habit 
																																																								
51 Thus, Cave (1988) 33: “‘Ana-gnorisis’, like ‘re-cognition’…implies a recovery of something once 
known rather than merely a shift from ignorance to knowledge.” 
52 Braden (1985) 61 remarks on the Senecan tragic protagonist’s desire to gain validation from his or 
her victims. Dupont (1995) 151 makes a similar point specifically in relation to Seneca’s Medea. 
53 On sadistic spectatorship in Senecan tragedy more generally, see Littlewood (2004) 215-39. 
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of committing murders before she flees.54 Slaughter and escape are two events that 
recur, paired, throughout Medea’s story: she dismembers her brother, Absyrtos, as she 
sails from Colchis; she destroys Pelias before departing Thessaly; she leaves behind 
in Corinth the bodies of Creon, Creusa, and her own two children. Seneca stresses 
throughout the play this repetition inherent in Medea’s story, and he draws particular 
attention to the killing of Absyrtos because the act provides a precedent for Medea’s 
impending infanticide. Just as Medea will kill the second child in Jason’s presence, so 
she recalls Absyrtos’ death being “thrust in his father’s face” (funus ingestum patri, 
132); similarly, she treats the slaughter of her own children as a warped form of 
payment for her brother’s murder (956-7; 969-71; 982). Imagery of dismemberment is 
also used to connect the two events: when Medea in her final monologue urges her 
own children to embrace her – et infusos mihi / coniungite artus (“and join with me 
your poured out limbs”, 946-47) – her stilted and sinister language evokes the several 
references she has already made to Absyrtos’ limbs (47-8; 912), while infusos recalls 
the blood she has shed elsewhere (134-5: funestum impie / quam saepe fudi 
sanguinem; 452-3: quaeque fraternus cruor / perfudit arva).55 Pelias’ death, too, 
involves dismemberment and thus forms part of this nexus (133-4; 475-6). The 
overall effect of these associations is to demonstrate that Medea has always 
performed the kinds of actions she will perform again by the end of this play. Not just 
the external audience, but Jason too, as Medea’s internal audience, is called upon to 
recognize the uniformity of her behaviour. 
																																																								
54 As Armstrong (1982) 239-40 maintains, arguing against exclusively meta-literary interpretations of 
this line. The more even-handed approach of Boyle (2014) ad Med. 1019-22 demonstrates that the line 
can be read both ways, as a meta-literary trope and as a claim about repeated personal conduct.	
55 Segal (1986) 9 remarks that the “depersonalized and abstract vocabulary” used by Seneca to 
describe Medea’s embrace of her children (946-7) not only gives the passage a “self-consciously 
artificial” quality, but also sounds ominous in the context of the protagonist’s impending crime. 
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 Medea alludes to that uniformity even in Jason’s presence; the first words she 
speaks to him in the entire play are, “I have fled, Jason, I am fleeing. Changing 
abodes is nothing new, but the reason for flight is new: I used to flee on your behalf” 
(fugimus, Iason, fugimus. hoc non est novum, / mutare sedes; causa fugiendi nova est: 
/ pro te solebam fugere, 447-9).56 Her language here is almost identical to her 
statement in the recognition scene – sic fugere soleo – which, notably, comprises her 
final speech to Jason. Close correspondence between the two passages hints at an 
equivalent correspondence between Medea’s past and present action. Once again, 
Medea prompts Jason to acknowledge the behavioural patterns that have long since 
defined her character. Such is Medea’s desire to stress continuity and self-coherence 
that she does not ask Jason, “do you recognize me?” but instead phrases her question 
so that it invites Jason to acknowledge in her precisely the woman he once married: 
coniugem agnoscis tuam? Medea has not, will never, change.57 
 
RECOGNITION WITHOUT REUNION 
 
The self-construction that Medea pursues so relentlessly in this play comes at the 
expense of everything else. Whereas conventional recognition scenes tend to involve 
a renewal of family relationships,58 Seneca’s Medea achieves the opposite, namely, 
she seeks acknowledgement for her ability to destroy interpersonal ties. Her request 
that Jason recognize her as his wife plays ironically on the ideas of reunion and 
legitimacy germane to ἀναγνώρισις in both tragic and comic plotlines. As Simon 
																																																								
56 I follow Boyle (2014) ad Med. 447 in construing the first fugimus as perfect tense, the second as 
present. 
57 The summation by Schiesaro (2003) 213 is worth quoting in full: “To be able to ‘recognize’ Medea 
as ‘Medea’, or Atreus as ‘Atreus’, is predicated on the immutability of fundamental characteristics 
which define them as what they are...They both guarantee that past patterns will prevail: they rise from 
the certainty of a model which their antagonists need to learn. Once they do, once they ‘recognize’, 
they admit the fallibility of their desire, or hope, for change.”  
58 On the key role of family relationships in ἀναγνώρισις see Aristotle Poetics 1452b, as well as the 
structural study by Sissa (2006). 
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Goldhill remarks, recognitions typically reassert and also authorize relationships 
between people: Electra regains her brother; Ion reclaims his status as Creusa’s child; 
Oedipus learns simultaneously his true parentage and the socio-sexual boundaries he 
has unwittingly crossed.59 The results are even more pronounced in New Comedy and 
palliata, where long-lost children are recovered and status issues resolved so that 
long-term lovers are finally able to unite; ἀναγνώρισις brings with it the prospect of 
restoring order to previously incomplete, incorrect, or unbalanced collectivities.60 
Seneca’s Medea, however, longs to cut all social ties, and the profusion of family 
terms used by Seneca throughout the tragedy only serves to emphasize his heroine’s 
ruinous pursuit of isolation and autonomy. 
 One example is Medea’s obsessive desire to be acknowledged as Jason’s wife.61 
She begins her tragedy by invoking “the gods of marriage and Lucina guardian of the 
marriage-bed” (di coniugales tuque genialis tori, / Lucina, custos 1-2), and refers to 
herself as coniunx far more frequently than do other characters in the play.62 Like the 
Medea of Ovid’s Heroides, she focuses on her dowry and on the impossible process 
of restitution she feels that Jason ought to perform as a consequence of their 
‘divorce’: tibi patria cessit, tibi pater frater pudor / hac dote nupsi; redde fugienti sua 
(“my fatherland fell to you, my brother, father, modesty. I married you with this 
dowry; give the fugitive back what is hers” 487-8).63  Her opening speech even 
includes the bitter wish that Jason’s future sufferings will make his marriage to her 
seem a blessing in retrospect: me coniugem optet (“let him long for me as his wife” 
																																																								
59 Goldhill (1986) 84.	
60 A point that emerges clearly from Konstan (1983). 
61 See in particular Abrahamsen (1999) and Guastella (2001). Frank (1995) also makes some pertinent 
observations about the rhetorical effects of kinship terms in Senecan tragedy. 
62 A tendency noted by Abrahamsen (1999) 110-13. 
63 Cf. Ovid Her. 12.199-203 
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22).64 In fact, the wish verges on paradox, because having Jason long for her as his 
wife is precisely what Medea wants at this early point in the drama. Yet she also 
wants to achieve her identity by destroying family ties so that Jason no longer has any 
wife at all.  
 The same paradoxical tension underlies her final request for Jason’s 
recognition: Medea wants Jason to claim her and no other in the role of his wife, but 
she also wants to confirm that she has abolished all of that role’s actual, social 
requirements. The verb agnoscere itself articulates this conflict because it can refer 
specifically to legitimization and family reunion, as is often the case in descriptions of 
parents legally recognizing their offspring: quem ille natum non agnoverat, eundem 
moriens suum esse dixerat (“he had not acknowledged him as a son, but declared him 
so on his deathbed” Nep. Ag. 1.4); expositum qui agnoverit, solutis alimentis recipiat 
(“a father who recognizes a son exposed in infancy, will take him back only after 
having paid for his upbringing” Quint. Inst. 7.1.14). Placed alongside these examples, 
Medea’s request for recognition evokes familial restoration and the resumption of 
social duties: Jason is called upon to recognize Medea’s spousal status in a legal as 
well as emotional sense, even while Medea’s vengeful acts have precluded the 
possibility of reunion.65 Thus, Seneca’s recognition scene hints at only to deny the 
renewal that ἀναγνώρισις typically brings. Confirmation of Medea’s identity prevents 
rather than generates social reintegration. 
																																																								
64 Although Zwierlein (1986a) follows Axelson in emending optet to opto, I agree with Hine (2000) ad 
loc. that the MSS reading should be retained because the paradox expressed by me coniugem optet 
seems typically Senecan.	
65 It could be argued that Medea’s marital status is inherently questionable, from both a social and 
legal perspective: her ‘dowry’ is far from a real dowry, and her father, Aeetes, never consented to the 
match. Moreover, as Abrahamsen (1999) asserts, Medea’s non-citizen status invalidates her marriage 
to Jason in the eyes of Roman law. However, what matters is Seneca’s final scene is not the reality of 
the law, but the traditions of legitimization and reunion that legal terms help to evoke. That Medea 
wants but cannot achieve legal acknowledgement only reinforces the unique style of this recognition 
scene, which simultaneously conjures and denies any hope of social renewal. 
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 Such allusions to reunification haunt the final exchange between Jason and 
Medea as if to remind the audience of other, happier versions of dramatic recognition. 
For example, when Jason arrives on stage, Medea describes the culmination of her 
revenge as a moment that reverses time and reinstates her as a virginal Colchian 
princess:66 
Iam iam recepi sceptra germanum patrem,  
spoliumque Colchi pecudis auratae tenent;  
rediere regna, rapta uirginitas redit.  
o placida tandem numina, o festum diem, 
o nuptialem! 
 
Now, now I have regained sceptre, brother, father, 
and the Colchians keep the golden animal’s fleece; 
the kingdom has been restored, my lost virginity restored. 
O divine powers, finally favourable, O festive day, 





Medea’s assertion is a hyperbolic reflection of the customary events of recognition 
scenes, in which brothers really are united with sisters, and fathers with children. 
Even Medea’s perversely gleeful reminder that this is Jason’s wedding day (o 
nuptialem!) conjures, obliquely, the love matches that tend to conclude New Comic 
and palliata plots.67 Moreover, with Creusa now dead by Medea’s hand, the heroine’s 
exultant o nuptialem articulates her own, sole claim to be Jason’s wife; it hints, 
bitterly, at the resumption of social relationships so often dependent on acts of 
ἀναγνώρισις. 
																																																								
66 While Medea’s claims make no sense if taken literally, several critics have proposed other, viable 
ways of reading them: Guastella (2001) 213-17 interprets Medea’s revenge against Jason as symbolic 
repayment for the crimes she has previously committed against her father, Aeetes; Schiesaro (2009) 
228-34 suggests that they are symptomatic of Medea’s obsession not just with the past, but with her 
past self. As Kerrigan (1996) 277 points out, undoing the past is one of the avenger’s main aspirations. 
67  Despite pioneering work by Tarrant (1978) and Grant (1999), Seneca’s debt to New 
Comedy/comoedia palliata remains a relatively unexplored and potentially very rich topic.   
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 In like manner, Jason’s acceptance of his sons’ bodies seems to build upon, 
almost to parody, the convention of parent-child recognition that pervades earlier 
drama. The event is facilitated by Medea herself, who differs from Euripides’ heroine 
in her lack of concern for her children’s burial (cf. Eur. Med. 1378-83).68 Rather than 
carry the corpses with her, Seneca’s Medea leaves them for Jason, declaring 
sarcastically, “now take back your sons, as their parent” (recipe iam natos parens, 
1024). Comparable language of restitution and recovery is used to describe family 
reunions in comoedia palliata, as in Plautus’ Captivi, when Hegio thanks the gods for 
“giving back and restoring” his son (quom te redducem tuo patri reddiderunt, 923),69 
or in Terence’s Hecyra, when the courtesan Bacchis reveals Myrrina’s background 
story and, as a direct consequence, restores to Pamphilus both his son and his spouse 
(gnatum ei restituo.../uxorem...reddo; “I return his son to him.../ I give back his wife” 
818-19). The parallels in vocabulary suggest a further, structural similarity: like the 
fathers of Roman comedy, Jason takes part in a recognition scene in which he is 
granted the opportunity to acknowledge and reclaim his children. The verb recipere 
may even suggest the legitimizing function of ἀναγνώρισις since it, along with 
agnoscere, features in the legal maxim reported by Quintilian (Inst. 7.1.14: expositum 
qui agnoverit, solutis alimentis recipiat). Thus, Medea’s language in this final 
exchange pushes Jason, however ironically, to assume an authorizing, paternal role in 
relation to the family he has disrupted. Seneca’s handling of the scene draws attention 
to the reintegration and social harmony so often consequent upon acts of recognition, 
making their absence from his tragedy all the more acute. The paradox for Seneca’s 
Medea is that self-coherence and consequent recognizability entail the kind of crimes 
																																																								
68 Noted by Hine (2000) ad Med. 1024	
69 It must, however, be noted, with Lacey (1978-79) 132, that Plautus rarely uses the father-son 
reconciliation motif to conclude his plays. 
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that will destroy any chance of a family reunion. Acting in the role of Jason’s wife 
leads Medea, ultimately, to be a wife in name only. Likewise, she leaves Jason in the 




Medea’s pursuit of ideal selfhood happens at the expense of the self-in-relationship, 
and her solipsism stands in stark contrast to the conventionally social consequences of 
recognition. Like the Stoic sage, for whom she is a dark mirror image, Seneca’s 
Medea achieves a radical form of independence – a kind of autarkeia – as a result of 
her conscious, careful self-realization.70 Also like the Stoic sage, Medea is concerned 
to shape her identity, behave coherently, live up to her assigned role and ensure her 
actions suit it. Her recognition scene, besides being an example of meta-theatre, draws 
attention to the complex interplay of literary character and actual, human selfhood, as 
Medea employs Stoic principles to build her essentially textual persona. Her conduct 
throughout the tragedy is a blend of textual and ethical elements that has performance 
at its core: Seneca’s Medea acts in accordance with her theatrical and personal past in 
order to be recognizable – and acknowledged – as a character in a play, as an actor, 
and as an implied human personality. It is this view of identity as performance that 
leads Seneca to adapt the dramatic tradition of ἀναγνώρισις so that it confirms rather 
than reveals Medea’s essential nature. In Senecan tragedy, role-play enhances rather 
than denies fundamental aspects of characters’ identities, consequently narrowing the 
gap between fabricated theatrical persona and actual, human selfhood. An equivalent 
situation prevails in Stoic ethical theory, where human beings are likened to actors 
and roles; where appropriateness is envisaged in terms of a seamless performance; 
																																																								
70 Both Braden (1985) 34 and 57, and Johnson (1988) 87 and 93-7 perceive traces of Stoic autarkeia in 
Medea’s conduct. 
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where identity is simultaneously constructed and genuine. Of course, with so much 
overt self-posturing the tragedy’s conclusion can hardly come as a surprise, but that 
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